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ABSTRACT
This paper finds remarkable heterogeneity in the relationship between legal traditions and finance in
former colonies. The effect of the British common law on financial development is conditioned by the
level of initial endowments. In former colonies with low precolonial population density the common law
has promoted high financial development, but where endowments were abundant this legal tradition has
not worked well. In contrast, the effect of the French civil law on finance is invariant to endowments.
British common law countries do not exhibit greater financial development levels than French civil law
countries when endowments are sufficiently high.
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21. INTRODUCTION
Many economists have stressed the pivotal role of the financial system in the process of
economic development.1 As a result, a growing number of studies have sought to explain why
some countries have a well-functioning financial system and others do not. A very influential
explanation is the law and finance theory, which emphasizes the role of legal institutions as
an important engine of financial development. It is commonly believed that the British
common law tends to support the protection of property rights of private investors vis-à-vis
the state to a much larger extent than the French civil law, with positive ramifications on
financial development. Another widely held theory focuses on the initial conditions existing
in colonized territories. Factors such as disease environment, indigenous population density
or resources abundance determined the colonial strategy of Western powers and shaped the
incentives to create different types of institutions. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003a)
relate the endowment theory to financial development by arguing that sound private property
rights protection is key to financial contracting, which is a prerequisite for financial systems
to develop.2
The law and finance theory and the endowment theory are not mutually exclusive because
they both explain in different ways the influence of colonialism on national legal systems and
more particularly, on those institutions that enforce private property rights and contracts.
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003a) provide empirical evidence that both theories
matter for financial development. We go one step further by asking whether the effect of
1 Levine (1997, 2005a) provides authoritative reviews of the theories and empirics behind the finance and
growth nexus. Using a deterministic nonparametric production frontier approach, Badunenko and Romero-
Ávila (forthcoming) find evidence that financial development accounts for up to 20% of labor productivity
growth over the period 1965-2005.
2 The original contributions regarding the law and finance theory correspond to La Porta et al. (1997,
1998) and those relative to the endowment theory are Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000) and Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002).
3legal traditions on finance is conditioned or not by the level of endowments. It is relevant to
study whether the British common law and the French civil law work better in some countries
than in others depending on their initial endowments. In fact, Ross Levine (2005b, p. 84)
poses the following question: “do the law and endowments interact?” Given that the French
civil law is associated with worse institutions than the British common law, he suspects that
the negative effect could be particularly large in territories with adverse endowments. To our
surprise, these interesting questions have not yet been addressed in the literature.
This paper tries to fill this gap by testing the presence of heterogeneity in the interaction
between legal traditions and endowments. Particularly, we expect the effect of the common
law on finance to depend negatively on initial endowments, whereas the effect of the French
civil law is expected to be constant irrespective of initial endowments. On the one hand, we
argue that the common law works optimally when it is well implanted by European
practitioners, as occurred in the settler colonies of North America and Australasia. In these
sparsely populated places at the time of colonization, property rights and private contracts
were enforced and financial markets could prosper. However, in large parts of its empire,
Britain conducted a colonial policy known as “indirect rule” which did not intend to
effectively introduce its legal system, particularly in territories politically organized or
extensively occupied by native population, like Sub-Saharan Africa (Zweigert and Kötz
1998). Rather, local rules were left almost intact and political and judicial powers were
concentrated in the hands of traditional chiefs. This led to the control of economic resources
by elites, with little incentive to protect property rights and enforce contracts, thus rendering
underdeveloped financial systems. On the other hand, France conducted a very different
colonial policy based on the ideal of legal and cultural assimilation and a centralized
conception of its colonial empire, which was considered as an intrinsic part of the Republic
4(Fieldhouse 1966, Zweigert and Kötz 1998). The result was the imposition of the Civil Code
in a more rigid and uniform way, which led to a more homogeneous effect of the French civil
law on legal and financial systems across colonized territories. This indicates that initial
endowments play a different role in each legal tradition. The British common law produces
worse outcomes in territories with larger endowments, whereas the French civil law leads to
similar results irrespective of the level of endowments.3
Table 1 (Panel A) provides some preliminary evidence on this issue. Rows present former
colonies classified according to their legal traditions. The first two columns show the mean
values of our main financial indicator (private credit over GDP) for colonies with population
density in 1500 below and above the median. The third column reports the t-statistic of mean
differences. For the full sample of colonies, those with greater precolonial population density
have, on average, a level of private credit about 20 percent of GDP lower. The difference
appears highly significant, which fits well with the endowment theory. Moreover, the last
column shows that British common law countries exhibit higher financial development than
French civil law countries, which is also consistent with the law and finance theory.
However, both patterns vanish when legal traditions interact with endowments. Interestingly,
only common law countries fit well with the endowment theory, as given by significantly
lower financial development for a level of endowments above the median. In contrast, French
civil law countries exhibit a level of private credit largely independent of initial endowments.
These patterns are supported by Figure 1 that shows that endowments only play an important
role in common law countries but do not in French civil law countries. Returning to Table 1,
another remarkable observation can be made: the common law is not always associated with
3 Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila (forthcoming) provide preliminary evidence that the differing systems of
colonial administration implanted by France and Britain as a response to initial endowments conditioned
the subsequent institutional development of former colonies.
5higher financial development, since civil law countries have a higher level of private credit
(0.24 versus 0.17) for population density above the median.
[Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 about here]
This study makes another contribution by providing evidence for the need to divide the
wide group of colonies labeled as French civil law into three categories, according to the way
the civil law was transmitted to the recipient country. The first category brings together
colonies obtaining the French civil law by France itself. The second consists of the former
Spanish colonies, while the third group comprises the remaining colonies. As detailed below,
their historical experiences are very different and there are reasons to believe that the
reception of the French civil law varies from one group to another. More specifically, the
Spanish American colonies share the Castilian law legacy and the adoption of the Civil Code
by imitation, aspects that facilitated the reception of the French civil law. Thus, we expect
former Spanish colonies to have higher financial development than former French colonies.
In line with our predictions, Table 1 (Panel B) shows notable differences in financial
development among the three French civil law groups, with the ‘Spanish law legacy’ group
almost doubling the financial development level of the ‘implantation by France’ group.
This preliminary evidence is extended below with the estimation of cross-country
regressions for a sample of 100 former colonies. An interaction model is proposed to explain
financial development through legal traditions, endowments and their interaction. The
analysis is formulated in terms of five main hypotheses and gives consistent support to our
theory-based predictions: 1) the effect of the common law on financial development is
influenced negatively by the level of initial endowments, 2) the effect of the French civil law
on finance does not depend on initial endowments, 3) there is heterogeneity in the interaction
6between legal traditions and endowments, 4) the common law is not always related to higher
financial development since the French civil law equals the common law when the level of
endowments is sufficiently high,4 and 5) there are significant differences within the French
civil law tradition, in particular, former Spanish colonies are associated with more financial
development than French colonies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the law and finance
and the endowment theories. It also formulates some plausible hypotheses that result from
interacting legal traditions with endowments and from categorizing French civil law countries
into three groups. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy and the data used. Section 4
presents the basic regression evidence as well as the results of extensive robustness checks.
Section 5 puts forward some implications and concludes.
2. THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS
2.1 Law and finance theory
The law and finance theory stems from the pioneering work of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998),
who trace the relationship among legal traditions, legal institutions and financial
development. Beck and Levine (2005) decompose the law and finance theory into two broad
propositions. First, financial development is promoted when legal institutions guarantee
private property rights and enforce contractual arrangements. Second, countries’ legal
traditions can account for differences in current legal systems and financial development.
4 Throughout the analysis, when we talk about high levels of endowments we either refer to high
precolonial population density (implying abundance of indigenous labor), high mineral resources
abundance, land suitability for plantation crops or to high settler mortality. According to the endowment
theory, a common feature to all endowments is that they are fundamental factors for explaining the
colonial strategies followed by Western powers. High levels of endowments are generally associated with
low European settlement and the prevalence of extractive institutions aimed to exploit the resources of the
colonized territories.
7Through conquest, colonization and imitation the British common law and the French civil
law spread around the world. Both legal families exhibit different features, which can be
traced back several hundred years to the British and French revolutions or even earlier
(Klerman and Mahoney 2007, Glaeser and Shleifer 2002). Unlike the French civil law, the
common law is thought to be more respectful with private property rights and private
contracts, to be less supportive of government regulation and to promote the independence of
the judiciary (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008). Two mechanisms explain the
superior performance of the British common law: the “political” and the “adaptability”
channels. The first implies that legal traditions differ in the weight assigned to private
property vs. the rights of the State, while the second focuses on judicial formalism and the
ability for each tradition to evolve. The historical victory of the coalition among the English
Parliament, bourgeoisie and judges against royalists in the English civil wars in the
seventeenth century promoted the protection of private property rights. Moreover, the case-
law principle, based on the judicial precedent, provided Britain with a legal system that could
easily adapt its law to changing circumstances (Beck and Levine 2005). In contrast, in the
French Revolution the principle of separation of powers relegated judges to a secondary role
of mechanical application of the law, while the state’s powers were strengthened. Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003b) provide an empirical evaluation of these two
mechanisms, finding evidence more supportive of the “adaptability channel”.
Merryman (1996) states that despite the emphasis made on the principle of separation of
powers and the subordination of judges to the legislator in the French revolutionary period,
soon after the situation would be relaxed and French courts would be granted the power to
interpret laws. However, “when the French exported their system [to their colonies] they did
8not include the information [saying] that it really does not work that way” (p. 116), thus
hindering the development of the judicial system in many developing countries.
When the law and finance theory is applied to former colonies, the massive transplant of
legal systems by Western powers is considered to be an extraordinary historical event that has
shaped and oriented the legal system of former colonies. European powers introduced
statutes, codes, legal principles and court systems, thus determining the particular legal
tradition transplanted to colonial dominions. Even nowadays, some authors find legal
connections or “contemporary transplants” between origin countries like France and Britain
and their former colonies (Spamann 2010).
2.2 Endowment theory
Proponents of the endowment theory focus on the initial conditions (or endowments) in
colonized territories, which influenced the type of political and economic institutions
established by European powers. Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000) point out that factors
such as indigenous population, mineral resources and land suitable for sugarcane crops led to
the predominance of large scale-plantations and mining in the New World, which originated
highly unequal societies with institutions biased to privilege the elite. In contrast, North
America was sparsely populated and lacked conditions for large plantations. This led to
colonies of settlement where smallholder farmers of European descent established
constitutional systems with a high degree of self-government that was conducive to
subsequent economic development. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002) argue
that the economic profitability of alternative colonial policies and the suitability for European
settlements are responsible for the colonial strategy followed. Hence, in those places where
European settlement was discouraged by high tropical disease or where the extraction of
9indigenous resources was favored by the existence of a dense (and relatively prosperous)
native population, extractive institutions were established. This would lead to a reversal of
fortune, since initially sparsely populated territories that received a large European settlement
favoring “institutions of private property” would eventually overtake densely populated
territories of indigenous majority that were initially more prosperous (Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson 2002).5 Along similar lines, Easterly and Levine (2003) provide evidence that
endowments (measured through tropical location, settler mortality and the types of crops and
minerals) affect current income levels only through their effect on property rights, even after
controlling for legal origin.
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003a) relate the endowment theory to finance since in
those places where institutions limited executive powers and elites’ domination, private
property rights could be protected, thus fostering financial development. In contrast,
“extractive colonies” hardly generated “institutions that favor the development of free,
competitive financial markets because competitive markets may threaten the position of the
extractors” (p. 140). The relevant factor was not the short-run effects of exploitation policies,
but the long-run consequences of “extractive institutions”, which had as a distinguishing
feature “a high concentration of political power in the hands of a few who extracted resources
from the rest of the population” (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2002, p. 1264). This
structure of power concentration persisted over time, hindering the emergence of institutions
conducive to economic development. 6
5 Bruhn and Gallego (2012) also provide evidence of “reversal of fortunes” for a sample of 345 regions
belonging to 17 American countries.
6 Comparing the development of the banking sector in the U.S. and Mexico, Acemoglu and Robinson
(2012) argue that political institutions inherited from the colonial past originated, in one case, a developed
and competitive banking system and, in the other, an underdeveloped and monopolistic one.
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2.3 Interacting legal traditions with endowments
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003a) realize that the law and finance and the
endowment theories are not mutually exclusive and provide evidence that both matter for
financial development. We go one step further by asking whether the effect of legal traditions
on finance is conditioned by the level of endowments.
Comparing the reception of French and British laws, Zweigert and Kötz (1998) state that
“French colonial policy always sought in the long run to assimilate the native populations”
(p. 113). The pursuit of legal assimilation led the French colonial legislation to encourage the
natives to adopt the French law. In contrast, in their words “English policy was different: true
to the principle of ‘Indirect Rule’, English colonial administrators relied as much as possible
on existing native rules, kept the local courts decentralized, and left mature native law almost
intact” (p. 113). Interestingly, within the British empire Zweigert and Kötz differentiate two
groups of colonies: the settler colonies, which at the time of colonization were “unoccupied
or occupied only by natives at a very early stage of civilization and not yet politically
organized” (p. 220); and the rest, which were colonies previously controlled by native kings
or other European powers. In the first group the common law applied mechanically, while in
the second the application of indirect rule implied that “to much the largest part of the
African population the Common Law is of almost no practical significance” (p. 230).7
7 Glendon, Carozza, and Picker (2008) indicate that there was an extensive reception of the common law
in territories characterized by the absence of “civilized” local law and the presence of only a small
indigenous population. In their opinion, the civil law is easier to receive than the common law because of
the “convenience of codes rather than a matrix of case law and statutes, the more complex language of the
common law and the ability to accept a Roman based civil law which is private and [poses] little threat to a
political system” (Glendon, Carozza, and Picker, p. 174). In previous work, Glendon, Gordon, and Osakwe
(1985) point out that the proper functioning of the common law depends on the development of a body of
judicial precedents, which is not easy to materialize. In this respect, Joireman (2004) states that the
evolutionary nature of the common law is generally true in developed countries but it should not be
assumed in poor countries. Kenya, for example, lacks an organized record of legal decisions, which is
necessary for the application of the judicial precedent.
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Whereas the French empire was highly centralized and directly ruled, Britain opted for a
system of colonial administration with more flexibility, variability to local conditions and
local autonomy, which in many parts of the empire took the form of indirect rule (Fieldhouse
1966).8 French centralism led to a more uniform application of the law across its empire,
while the British showed clear variability in the way the common law was exported to
colonial societies. Also, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003a) point out that Britain and
France differ in their strategies of implanting the law. Britain applied the common law more
flexibly and did not try to replace local laws and indigenous customs, while France imposed
its Code rigidly despite conflicting with local customs.9 Lange (2004) argues that British
indirect rule strengthened the positions of traditional chiefs as customary law administrators,
which led to abuses of power, control of economic resources by elites and imperfect
protection of property rights. Lange uses the colonial dependence on customary courts as an
indicator of indirect rule and argues that the degree of indirect rule was related to local
endowments such as the disease environment and precolonial population density.10
8 The different colonial strategies between the British and the French are well reflected in their ratios of
colonial officials to population in the 1930s. This ratio equaled 3,660:15,000,000 for French West Africa,
which contrasts with the ratio 1,315:20,000,000 for Nigeria (Kirk-Greene 1980).
9 A good account of the variability in the degree of application of the common law by the British to their
colonial dominions is provided by Daniels, Trebilcock, and Carson (2011). In Nigeria, where indirect rule
was extensively exercised, there existed two parallel courts: colonial courts applicable only to matters
involving Europeans and native courts that –under indigenous customs and rules– dealt with all disputes
between non-Europeans, who under certain conditions could also appeal to the British court. This dual
court system implied that the common law hardly applied to the great majority of the indigenous
population. In addition, since native chiefs were granted extensive executive powers by the British, and,
unlike precolonial times, were no longer subject to check and balances by the native population, they
undermined the historical legitimacy of the native court system as well as the effectiveness of their
customary law. Unlike indirectly ruled areas in Africa, India was administered as a “direct/indirect rule
hybrid” and managed to gradually adapt the colonial legal system to the needs of the Indian population,
which resulted in the creation of “a court hierarchy and a body of law that was both effective and accepted
by the native population” (p. 135).
10 Comparing the direct and indirect rule systems within India, Iyer (2010) finds that areas under direct
rule experience significantly lower levels of schooling, health provision and roads in addition to worse
poverty and infant mortality outcomes in the postcolonial period. A key to understanding why in this case
indirect rule led to better outcomes lays in the fact that hereditary kings had incentives to properly govern
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Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard (2003a, b) argue that the way European laws were
transplanted to the colonies is key to explaining the quality of legal systems. Receptive or
successful transplants are those that adapt the imported law to local conditions or when the
population is familiar with law principles. Under these conditions, countries are able to
develop extensive and effective legal institutions. The transplant of the British common law
to the colonies was receptive mostly in the settler colonies, and unreceptive in the extractive
colonies, as in sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast, the rigid implantation of the French civil law
in French colonies led to widespread unreceptive transplants, irrespective of initial
endowments. This suggests that the effect of initial endowments on the effectiveness of legal
systems varies across legal traditions.
The whole picture indicates that there were different patterns of transplantation of European
laws to the colonies. The implantation of the French civil law appeared to be more rigid and
mechanical, conducted uniformly across all colonies and was more ambitious, since the final
objective was legal assimilation. As a result of this homogeneity in the exportation of the law,
one would expect the relationship between the civil law and finance to be largely invariant to
endowments across former French colonies. By contrast, the implantation of the British
common law was not uniform across former colonies. In those places with a lower level of
endowments the common law was extensively implanted and fitted well with the colonial
their “native states”, since they could be removed in the event of misrule. In the case of British India, it is
important to distinguish the type of land revenue system in place. Iyer finds that a cultivator-based land
revenue system, where the ruler is in charge of collecting the revenue directly from cultivators, produced
superior public goods outcomes than a landlord-based revenue system, wherein the revenue collection is
carried out by landlords. These results appear in line with those of a previous study by Banerjee and Iyer
(2005) that did not include those areas in India under indirect rule. Interestingly, the good performance of
the indirect rule exercised by hereditary kings in the native states contrasts with that of the indirect rule
applied by landlords in British India, who –unlike the former– were not subject to removal in the case of
misrule. Therefore, Iyer’s overall results are not that different from those obtained for indirectly ruled areas
in Africa. Whenever the incentives faced by the local administrator are not appropriate, indirect rule can
lead to poor institutional governance, with negative repercussions on postcolonial development.
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society, which led to the development of legal institutions promoting financial markets. In
places with larger endowments where indirect rule generally prevailed, “extractive colonies”
were established and the superficial application of the British law barely influenced and even
distorted previous legal practices based on customary law.
The previous discussion allows us to draw a set of hypotheses, which will be tested in the
empirical section. Regarding the common law tradition, our prediction is reflected in the
following hypothesis H1: The common law leads to higher financial development when the
level of initial endowments is low, but at high levels of endowments it leads to lower financial
development. With respect to the civil law tradition, we formulate hypothesis H2: The civil
law has a constant (linear) effect on financial development, irrespective of the level of initial
endowments. The two previous hypotheses imply differentiated responses to endowments
among legal traditions. This can be formulated as an additional hypothesis H3: There is
heterogeneity in the interaction between legal traditions and endowments. Finally, since the
law and finance theory predicts higher financial development for common law countries and
considering the above hypotheses, we expect the following hypothesis (H4) to be satisfied: At
low levels of endowments the common law leads to higher financial development than the
civil law, but at sufficiently high levels of endowments the difference between the common
law and the civil law vanishes.
2.4 Differentiating colonies within the French civil law tradition
Within the group of former colonies belonging to the French civil law tradition there are
countries of very diverse origin. We argue for the need to distinguish among at least three
categories on the basis of the way the French law was obtained. The first category includes
those colonies that directly received the French civil law by France itself. This group contains
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24 former French colonies in our sample. The second category consists of the former Spanish
colonies (18 countries), whereas a third group comprises the remaining colonies (18
countries).11
There are two distinctive characteristics that make Spanish American colonies deserve
separate treatment: the enduring legacy of the Spanish law tradition and the particular
reception of the French Civil Code by imitation.12 Regarding the former, Spanish American
colonies were ruled by Castilian kings over three centuries before they achieved
independence. Over this broad interval, these territories experienced a long and continuous
process of reception of the Spanish law, which is a legal tradition with its own history and
idiosyncratic features.13 Initially after conquest, Spain transplanted Castilian laws to the
colonies, but over time a special legislation was successively developed, which was compiled
in the Recopilación de las Indias, a collection of 6,000 statutes published by Charles II in
1680 and applicable to all the American colonies (Gacto, Alejandre, and García 2003).14 The
11 This third group entails those territories that were colonies of countries other than France and Spain.
This is a heterogeneous group that comprises territories as diverse as the British mandates of the League of
Nations for the Middle East, the Portuguese colonies or the Belgian, Dutch and Italian colonies. Bringing
together colonies of such diverse origin into a residual group is not ideal, but it is the best available option
given the small number of observations in each sub-category. In the empirical section we show that our
results are robust to different classifications and even to the omission of this residual group.
12 A third distinctive feature of these countries is their mixed influences, because legislators have
increasingly incorporated other legal sources such as the American, German or Swiss law. This led to a
decline of French legal influence throughout the twentieth century (e.g. Zweigert and Kötz 1998, Garro
1992, Mirow 2005).
13 One must keep in mind the singularity and importance of the Spanish law tradition. Hamilton (1917)
stated that the “Spanish Civil Law is the most influential body of law on the globe today [...] It is no copy
of the Code Napoleon, although that was carefully consulted”. Its singularity comes from the Spanish
history and one can find on it “a Roman foundation, Gothic, Moslem, local and maritime elements” (p.
317). Commenting on the sources of the Spanish civil law, Brown (1956) places the Spanish law system in
a middle point between the English doctrine of precedent and the French position.
14 William W. Howe (1903) stressed the fundamental importance of the Spanish law for Central and South
America, since all these countries have derived their system of law and jurisprudence from Spain. In fact,
the study of the Castilian law Las Siete Partidas still maintains interest in this region. It was used, for
example, together with the French Civil Code, in the drafting of the prestigious Chilean Civil Code (Mirow
2001).
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influence of the Spanish law in the American colonies provided a background of ius
commune that facilitated the reception of the French Civil Code and other European sources.
Many traditional concepts and ideas of the Civil Code, especially those coming from Roman
law, represented no breach with the legal institutions established in Latin America. The
shared Roman roots of the Spanish and French legal traditions helped the reception of the
Civil Code (Zweigert and Kötz 1998, Garro 1992, Mirrow 2004).
The second feature shared by former Spanish American colonies is the specific way of
importation of the French civil law. Since these territories achieved their independence at the
beginning of the nineteenth century, they were free to choose and build by themselves their
legal systems. Thus, they received the French civil law by imitation, that is, through
voluntary transplant, which increases the chances of receptivity by allowing the adaptation of
foreign law to local conditions (Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard 2003a). The civil codes of
Chile and Argentina are good examples of adaptation to national circumstances, and many
countries in the region took them as models (Mirrow 2001, Zweigert and Kötz 1998). In
contrast, as noted by Merryman (1996), colonies receiving the French Civil Code directly by
France itself did so more rigidly and did not receive the blueprints of how courts could
interpret the law rather than simply apply it –as held by the Napoleonic doctrine. This led to
inefficient outcomes and expectedly hindered the development of the judicial system and in
turn inhibited financial development in former French colonies (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Levine 2003b).
For all these reasons, there is no point in assimilating the reception of the French civil law
in Spanish America to that in other regions such as West and Central Africa.15 Therefore, we
15 In addition, the substance of the law is also different because in one case legal systems are impregnated
with the Spanish legal culture, while in the other with African and tribal customs. Further arguments
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expect the Spanish civil law tradition to lead to higher financial development than when the
civil law is implanted by France itself. Regarding the impact of endowments, we expect
hypothesis H2 to hold for both ‘Spanish law legacy’ and ‘implantation by France’ groups.
This is because Spain, like France, implanted its legal system homogenously and in a
centralized way across its empire, irrespective of precolonial endowments. This created
similar conditions among its colonies for the reception of the French civil law, which must be
reflected in a constant effect of the Spanish law legacy on financial development.16 The
above discussion leads us to formulate hypothesis H5: There are differences in the effect of
the Spanish civil law tradition on financial development relative to the case when the civil
law is implanted by France itself, but no significant differences across both civil law groups
in their response to endowments.
Finally, with respect to the third group within the French legal tradition, i.e., the group
‘others’, we do not make specific predictions because this residual group comprises former
colonies occupied by different colonial powers and we lack an appropriate theory for the way
each of these powers transplanted the civil law to their colonial dominions. However, we can
at least suggest that since they belong to the civil law tradition, they share features with the
other civil law countries and, therefore, we expect a similar behavior.
justify the creation of the ‘Spanish law legacy’ category. The use of years since independence as a
discriminating factor among civil law countries supports our classification, since 17 of the 19 colonies that
became independent before 1850 were Spanish. Furthermore, although there is variability within Spanish
American legal systems, differences with respect to the other French civil law groups are higher. Thus, we
observe more homogeneity within the ‘Spanish law legacy’ group than in the whole group of civil law
countries. For example, the Spanish law group presents a coefficient of variation for the indicator “creditor
rights aggregate score” (from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008) of 0.80, lower than the value
for the whole civil law group (1.02) and that for civil law countries not belonging to the Spanish law
tradition (1.14). Regarding the ratio of private credit to GDP, the Spanish law group presents the highest
level of homogeneity, as reflected in the lowest coefficient of variation 0.57 versus 0.76 for the whole civil
law group and 0.85 for civil law countries not belonging to the Spanish law tradition.
16 As far as hypotheses H3 and H4 are concerned, they are equally applicable to both French civil law
groups.
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3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND DATA
3.1 Empirical strategy
The general approach to assessing the role played by legal traditions and endowments has
been the estimation of additive models (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2003a, Levine
2005b). This type of model only allows for constant (linear) effects of legal origin on
financial development, thus being unable to test the set of hypotheses formulated above.
Towards that end, we need an interaction model that allows for the possibility of
heterogeneity in the coefficient on endowments such that:
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(1)
where finance is the indicator of financial development, α is the constant term, civil_law is
a dummy variable capturing whether the legal tradition is the French civil law (taking the
British common law as the reference group, reflected in the constant term),
common_law*endow and civil_law*endow represent the interaction terms between the two
legal traditions and the endowments indicator, and εi is the error term.17
We test hypothesis H1 through the coefficient on the interaction term common_law*endow.
If β2 is consistently negative and statistically significant, the proposition that the effect of the
common law depends negatively on initial endowments will be accepted. Likewise, we test
hypothesis H2 through the coefficient on the interaction term civil_law*endow. If β3 is neither
consistently negative and significant nor consistently positive and significant, then we can
accept H2 and assume that the effect of the civil law on finance is invariant to initial
endowments.
17 Throughout the paper, we use ordinary least squares and report heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors.
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Regarding hypothesis H3 that supports the heterogeneity in the interaction between legal
traditions and endowments, it is tested by comparing the β2 and β3 coefficients. If both are
significantly different, then H3 is accepted. Hypothesis H4 –concerning the relative effects on
financial development of the common law vs. the civil law– can be tested by comparing the
predicted values of financial development for both legal traditions at low and high levels of
endowments.
Moreover, we argued above for the need to differentiate among three groups within the
French civil law tradition on the basis of the way the civil law was received, namely,
‘implantation by France’, ‘Spanish law legacy’ and ‘others’. This leads us to estimate a more
complete model, which constitutes our reference specification:
iii
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(2)
This model allows us to test hypothesis H5 by statistically comparing the coefficients on the
variables corresponding to the ‘implantation by France’ and the ‘Spanish law legacy’
categories. We expect statistically significant differences between the β1 and β2 coefficients,
but no significant differences between the β5 and β6 coefficients, as given by the similar
response across both civil law groups with respect to endowments. We will also be able to
check whether β1 is lower than β2, as implied by the more adverse effect of the civil law
tradition on financial development when it is implanted by France itself relative to Spanish
colonies.
3.2 Data
The sample is restricted to overseas former colonies of Western powers, which excludes for
example Japanese colonialism and colonies within the European continent. The restriction to
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former colonies is due to two reasons. First, legal traditions are arguably exogenous only for
colonized territories since European powers transplanted their legal systems irrespective of
the will and the endogenous development of indigenous societies. In this sense, colonialism is
seen as a kind of natural experiment to assess the impact of legal traditions (Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Levine 2003a). Second, the endowment theory is applicable only to former
colonies since what matters is the influence of initial conditions on the colonial strategies and
policies implemented by colonizers. The resulting sample contains only countries within the
British common law and French civil law traditions. There are a maximum of 100 ex-
colonies for which data on our main indicators of financial development, legal traditions and
endowments are available.
As a first concern, it is necessary to choose a proxy for financial development. Finance
theory focuses on the role of financial institutions in channeling funds from savers to
investors, gathering information and allocating capital to the highest-yield investment
projects, exerting corporate control, pooling funds, managing risks and facilitating the
exchange of goods and services, and how all these functions translate into a better allocation
of resources and economic growth. Ideally, our measure of financial development should
account for these functions provided by the financial system. However, there is little
consensus on how to properly measure them. As noted by Rajan and Zingales (1998), what
the extant literature has done so far is to use some imperfect proxies that may miss many of
the key aspects to a modern financial system.
Among all the possible financial development proxies, our preferred measure is private
credit by deposit money banks and other non-bank financial institutions over GDP, which we
denote by private credit. Following Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003a) we also
employ indicators of equity market development and private property rights protection. Stock
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market capitalization equals the total value of listed shares over GDP and is used because
some economies rely more on financing directly through markets than via financial
intermediaries. Protection of property rights is an indicator provided by the Heritage
Foundation which measures the degree of protection of property rights by laws and the
government, the possibility of expropriation, the independence of the judiciary and the
enforcement of contracts. The law and finance and the endowment theories emphasize that
legal traditions and endowments influence property rights and other elements of the legal
environment, which are key to financial development.
Regarding the measure of endowments, our preferred choice is the logarithm of population
density in 1500, which comes from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) and represents
the precolonial level of development, since only rich territories could afford to be densely
populated. The importance of precolonial population density as an initial endowment is based
on the fact that it was a key factor that conditioned colonial strategies through various
channels. On the one hand, a high level of indigenous population limited European
settlements (Easterly and Levine 2012),18 which is a central factor for the type of legal-
administrative institutions established in the colonies. On the other hand, where Europeans
found more prosperous and densely populated societies, they had incentives to build
institutions to exploit indigenous resources.19 Moreover, the presence of highly dense native
18 Easterly and Levine (2012) find that population density in 1500 is a robust determinant of European
settlers. In contrast, potential settler mortality does not influence European settlers once precolonial
population density, indigenous mortality and latitude are controlled for. Likewise, Lange (2004) stresses
the importance of this variable by arguing that “large local populations limited settlement by obstructing
access to land and greatly increased the costs and risks of large-scale settlement” (p. 908).
19 The Spaniards employed a system of coercive labor known as encomienda with the aim of exploiting
the densely populated territories of the Aztec and Inca empires. Indeed, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012,
Ch. 1) point out that the key factor for the different colonial strategies of Spain and England in the New
World was the presence of native population that could be used as forced labor. Apart from Acemoglu and
his coauthors, indigenous population density is often quoted and widely used in the literature as
endowment indicator for explaining the colonial strategies and policies of European powers. See, among
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populations implies the existence of a society with its own rules (“Ubi Societas, Ibi Ius”),
which influenced the application of the common law to the colonies, as stressed by Zweigert
and Kötz (1998) and Glendon, Carozza, and Picker (2008). Another advantage of indigenous
population density over other alternatives is its availability for a larger cross-section of
countries, which enables us to expand the sample in Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine
(2003a) by about 30 countries. In addition, population density constitutes a more
comprehensive indicator of endowments, because it is also related to the disease
environment, as “malaria and yellow fever [...] were endemic in many of the densely settled
areas” (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2002, p. 1266). 20
Finally, the French civil law and the British common law are the dummy variables of legal
traditions, which come from La Porta et al. (1999). We refer the reader to Appendix A for
descriptions and sources of the rest of the variables. Appendix B contains the list of former
colonies categorized by legal origin and the identity of the colonizer.
4. REGRESSION RESULTS
4.1 Main regression results
Table 2 reports the basic results with private credit as the dependent variable. As a starting
point, we estimate a simple additive model in the first column. The signs of the variables are
as expected, with endowments and the French civil law carrying highly significant negative
others, Fieldhouse (1966), Engerman and Sokoloff (2000), Mahoney (2003), Lange (2004), Lange,
Mahoney, and vom Hau (2006) and Bruhn and Gallego (2012).
20 Precolonial urbanization rate may be a better proxy for pre-existing wealth, but it implies a drastic
reduction of the sample (for example, it does not include sub-Saharan Africa). Regarding potential settler
mortality rate, there is controversy on the reliability of the data (Albouy 2012) and also entails a significant
reduction in the sample. Moreover, after 1850 the widespread use of quinine meant that tropical diseases
declined in importance as an obstacle to European settlements (Olsson 2009), which implies that settler
mortality as an endowment indicator may be less appropriate for the imperialist wave of colonization.
Other variables such as geo-climatic conditions are rough indicators of endowments and do not reflect the
level of precolonial development.
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coefficients. In line with Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003a), these preliminary results
are consistent with the endowment and the law and finance theories.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Yet this is not the whole story. The results of the interaction model estimated in column 2
are appealing and give support to hypotheses H1 to H4. First, the interaction between the
common law and population density is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.
This is consistent with H1 that predicts that the effect of the common law on finance depends
negatively on initial endowments. Second, the interaction between the civil law and
population density is close to zero and highly insignificant, which clearly fits with H2, i.e.,
the civil law has a constant effect irrespective of the level of endowments. Third, the
coefficients on the interaction terms are clearly different (-0.144 vs. 0.006 for the common
law and the civil law, respectively),21 which supports H3 and indicates heterogeneity in the
responses of the legal traditions to initial endowments. And fourth, we can show that H4 is
also satisfied. At relatively low values of population density, for example, for a value of 1
(i.e. natural logarithm equal to 0), the predicted value of private credit for common law
countries is higher than that for civil law countries (0.49 vs. 0.22, respectively), being the
difference statistically significant.22 In contrast, for a level of population density of 10
(natural logarithm equal to 2.3), the predicted value of private credit for the British common
law is lower than that for the French civil law (0.16 vs. 0.23),23 though the difference is not
21 The Wald test strongly rejects the equality of coefficients at the 1% significance level. The Wald tests
for testing hypotheses H3, H4 and H5 are presented in the bottom part of the tables.
22 The statistical significance of the coefficient on the civil law dummy reflects whether the civil law
group is statistically different from the reference group (the common law) when the log of population
density is equal to 0.
23 The value for the common law is calculated as the constant –which measures the omitted group (i.e. the
British common law)– plus the coefficient on the interaction between the common law and endowments
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statistically significant. Therefore, the evidence indicates that at high levels of endowments,
French civil law countries at least equal the financial development level of common law
countries.24
Column 3 presents our reference model that divides the French civil law tradition into three
groups. It is remarkable that hypotheses H1 to H4 are also largely satisfied in this case and
hold for the three groups of French civil law tradition.25 It remains to be shown whether
hypothesis H5 is fulfilled. The dummy ‘implantation by France’ presents a larger negative
coefficient (-0.42) than the dummy ‘Spanish law legacy’ (-0.20), the difference being
statistically significant at the 1% level. Since the coefficients on the interaction terms for both
civil law categories are not significantly different (p-value of 0.14), we can assume the
differences reflected in the dummy variables to be largely invariant to the level of
endowments.26 Both findings account for the fact that the Spanish civil law tradition leads to
higher financial development than when the civil law is implanted by France itself. Regarding
the category ‘others’, it presents similar patterns to the Spanish law legacy group, with a
times the log of population density. Likewise, the value for the civil law is calculated as 0.49-
0.274+0.006*endow.
24 The relatively poorer performance of the common law at high levels of endowments can be related to
the findings of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), since they show that political institutions (instrumented by
endowments –population density in 1500 and settler mortality–) are more critical to economic growth,
investment, and financial development than contracting institutions (instrumented by legal origin). Hence,
Acemoglu and Johnson’s evidence suggests that endowments matter much more for financial development
than having a common law tradition; and arguably, when large endowments are present the adverse effect
on financial development dominates the positive effect from being a common law colony. Thus, it can be
inferred that the common law by itself does not guarantee financial development.
25 Note that the marginally significant positive coefficient on the interaction term ‘implantation by France
x Pop. dens.’ does not imply the rejection of H2, since it becomes insignificant once we introduce
additional control variables. Regarding H4, we also point out that for a level of population density of 10,
the predicted value of private credit for the ‘implantation by France’, ‘Spanish law legacy’ and ‘others’
groups equal 0.233, 0.288 and 0.262, which are larger than the predicted value for the common law group
(0.16), though again the differences between the predicted value of each civil law group and that of the
common law group are not statistically significant.
26 This holds throughout the analysis since the coefficients on the interaction terms for the civil law
groups are generally positive but insignificant once additional control variables are incorporated into the
specification.
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slightly larger negative coefficient on the dummy variable (-0.26) and an insignificant
coefficient on the interaction term.
All other columns of Table 2 introduce additional factors that may affect financial
development. We begin by including the logarithm of per capita GDP in column 4, which
corrects for the possibility that cross-country differences in income could be driving financial
development differences (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008), thereby controlling
for the existence of fixed costs in credit markets. Column 5 adds ‘years since independence’
because a long post-colonial period allows countries to develop institutions according to their
needs and eliminate inefficiencies from their colonial past (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Levine 2003a). From the work of Max Weber (1976), religion is seen as a potential
determinant of key capitalistic institutions. More recently, La Porta et al. (1999) use religion
as a proxy for culture to explain the quality of institutions. To control for this factor, column
6 introduces the fractions of population professing the different confessions. Another factor
susceptible to influencing finance is ethnolinguistic fractionalization, which is included in
column 7. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine argue that greater fractionalization is related to
policies and institutions intended to maintain the political and economic power instead of
creating a competitive financial system. In the last three columns, we introduce latitude, the
percentage of land in tropics and regional (continental) dummies. This will allow us to
discard the possibility that the results are due simply to a correlation between financial
development and colonies concentrated in areas with particular geographic features.
Table 2 offers a consistent pattern indicating the robustness of our baseline results. In
general, we find significantly negative coefficients on the civil law dummies, and the dummy
‘implantation by France’ appears with a larger negative coefficient than the other civil law
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categories. In addition, the interaction term ‘common law x pop. dens.’ always exhibits a
highly significant negative coefficient, whereas the coefficients on the interaction terms for
the civil law groups are never negative and in most cases are insignificant and close to zero.
Overall, these results appear in line with those obtained in the specification with no controls,
which imply that the five hypotheses formulated in Section 2 are largely satisfied.27
Regarding the control variables, per capita income, years since independence and latitude are
positively correlated with private credit, whereas the Africa dummy presents an expected
negative sign. Finally, Tables 3 and 4 use stock market capitalization and protection of
property rights as dependent variables. Remarkably, in both cases we find the same patterns
in the estimated coefficients as in the specification for private credit, though the evidence
supportive of hypotheses H3 and H5 is less clear-cut for the case of property rights protection
when the civil law tradition is disaggregated into three groups.
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here]
4.2 Sensitivity Analyses
In the previous tables we have controlled for a number of alternative factors in order to
ensure that our results are not affected by omitted variable bias. However, other problems
may still persist. In this subsection we apply extensive tests to control for political structure
27 The statistical difference between former French and Spanish colonies –as implied by H5– disappears
when controlling for geographic regions, years since independence and per capita income. The fact that the
Latin America and Caribbean dummy overlaps with former Spanish American colonies drives the
difference between both civil law categories insignificant. Something similar occurs due to the high
correlation between years since independence and Spanish law legacy, because all the Spanish American
colonies included in our analysis achieved their independence early in the nineteenth century (between
1811 and 1825). Finally, the endogeneity of per capita income may spuriously reduce the coefficient on the
independent variables, as argued in La Porta et al. (1999). This is what we observe for the coefficient on
‘implantation by France’ that almost halves and becomes close in size to that on the ‘Spanish law legacy’
group.
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variables, alternative indicators of endowments, sample selection and outliers. Table 5 reports
the results from these robustness checks for private credit.
The political environment is often seen as a potential determinant of finance. Groups in
power use their influence to shape policies and institutions to their own benefit (North 1990).
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) argue that economic institutions derive from
political power, which is the combination of political institutions and “de facto” political
power. Beck and Levine (2005) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) make
reference to a number of studies that challenge the explanatory power of legal origins using
political arguments. Our aim is to test whether our findings remain unchanged after
controlling for differences in the political structure of countries, since centralized and
powerful governments are more likely to be conditioned by the elite than competitive
political systems (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2001b). Columns 1 to 3 introduce three
political variables: ‘legislative competition’, ‘checks’ and ‘executive constraints’. The first
two are also employed by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003a) with the same purpose.
‘Legislative competition’ captures the degree of competition of the last legislative election
and ‘checks’ measures the number of influential veto players in legislative and executive
initiatives. ‘Executive constraints’ measures the “checks and balances between the various
parts of the decision-making process” (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2010, p. 24). In the three
cases, the results remain robust and only the indicator ‘checks’ appears correlated with
private credit.28
28 Following Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003a), we also estimated these regressions through two-
stage least squares, using as instruments for political structure the religion variables, years since
independence and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. The political structure variables never appeared
statistically significant whereas our previous results remained unchanged. Moreover, we regressed
financial development indicators only on political structure variables, using as instruments our legal
origins and endowments variables. Although political variables often exhibited significant coefficients, the
overidentification tests were rejected, reflecting that our independent variables influence financial
27
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Another concern could be the particular indicator of endowments employed. Although we
previously argued that population density in 1500 is the best possible indicator of
endowments available, the next four columns incorporate alternative indicators. Potential
mortality rate of European settlers (column 4) is an indicator introduced by Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2001) to account for the feasibility of settlements by Europeans.
According to the endowment theory we expect a negative relation between potential settler
mortality and financial development. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) provide
another indicator, the rate of precolonial urbanization, which is used as a proxy for
precolonial wealth. Since precolonial prosperity gave the incentive to set up “extractive
institutions” as a mechanism for extracting resources from colonial territories, we also expect
a negative relationship between this variable and financial development (column 5).
Column 6 introduces the inverse of the “wheat/sugar ratio” that represents the suitability of
land for sugarcane relative to wheat (Easterly 2007). Sugarcane was a widespread crop in
plantation colonies, whereas wheat was not advantageous in large-scale cultivation. Column
7 employs an indicator of mineral resources endowments that calculates the average of
mineral rents over GDP during the period 1960-2000. According to Engerman and Sokoloff
(1997, 2000), the plantation system and the exploitation of mineral resources in the New
World led to highly unequal societies that favored institutions built to benefit elites. For both
indicators the endowment theory suggests that the larger the endowments the lower the level
of financial development. The block of regressions devoted to alternative endowment
indicators provides a picture totally consistent with our previous results. Endowments are
development beyond the political structure of countries. All this holds for the other two indicators of
financial development considered.
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negatively related to finance only for the common law tradition, but not for civil law
countries.
The influence of outliers is another usual problem in econometric analysis. We consider
several statistical methods to identify outliers such as leverage, standardized residuals,
Cook’s distance and DFITS.29 Once outliers are detected, we exclude these countries and re-
run the regressions. Columns 8 to 10 clearly show that our findings remain unaltered when
outliers are excluded. In the remaining columns, we verify that the results are not driven by
specific regions or particular groups of countries. Column 11 removes the colonies known as
neo-Europes (USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), which are considered extreme
cases of British colonialism, with initially low indigenous population density and currently
highly developed financial systems. Column 12, 13 and 14 drop the regions Middle East and
North Africa, Latin America and Africa, respectively. It is remarkable that our findings are
highly robust to the presence of outliers as well as to the exclusion of several groups of
countries.30
29 The cut-offs of the detection methods are the following: leverage, 2·k/n; standardized residuals, |2|;
Cook’s distance, 4/n; DFITS, nk /2  ; where k is the number of parameters and n is the number of
observations. For outliers diagnostics and methods, see Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (2004).
30 Fairly similar results follow from these sensitivity analyses when the dependent variable is either stock
market capitalization or protection of property rights, though for the latter the evidence supportive of
hypotheses H3 and H5 is less clear-cut. For reasons of space, these results are not reported but are
available as unpublished appendices from the authors upon request. For similar reasons, we do not report
the results from the following robustness checks to alternative classifications of civil law countries. First,
we disaggregated the residual group ‘others’ at the highest possible level, resulting in five new
subcategories: British colonies (6 countries), Portuguese colonies (5), Belgian colonies (3), Dutch colonies
(2) and others (one Italian and one US colonies). The results for the common law and for the categories
‘implantation by France’ and ‘Spanish law legacy’ remain unchanged. Regarding the other civil law
subcategories, Portuguese colonies often report a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction
term, which does not fit with what we observe for the other civil law groups. Second, to be sure that our
findings are not driven by the residual group, we redo the analysis without the 18 countries belonging to
that group. The results remain remarkably robust with this reduced sample. Third, we use years since
independence rather than the colonizing country as a discriminating factor among civil law countries. We
can distinguish two well-differentiated groups: those countries enjoying more than 150 years of
independence and the rest. Using these two categories, we find the same pattern of heterogeneity in the
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5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper extends the law and finance theory by demonstrating heterogeneity in the
interaction between legal traditions and endowments. We find that the effect of the common
law on finance is conditioned by the level of endowments. Thus, for common law countries a
negative relation between endowments and financial development is consistently observed.
When one turns to civil law countries, the picture is quite different. We find that the impact
of the civil law on finance does not depend on the level of endowments. This heterogeneity
leads us to an interesting result in the relative effect of legal traditions: at low levels of
endowments the common law is associated with higher financial development, but as the
level of endowments rises, the difference between the British and French legal traditions
shrinks and becomes statistically insignificant. In that case, the prediction by the law and
finance theory that the common law tradition leads always to higher financial development
than the French civil law tradition does no longer hold. Also, it is interesting to note that the
endowment theory only fits with the group of common law colonies.
The different patterns of implantation of European legal systems in colonial territories are
key to understanding the results. According to Zweigert and Kötz (1998), Britain transplanted
its legal system in a heterogeneous way across its empire. Some territories received the
British common law extensively (e.g., settler colonies) and developed the legal requirements
for well-functioning financial markets. In other territories with large endowments the
implantation of the British law was very superficial and the system of colonial administration
known as indirect rule prevailed. This led to the concentration of power in the hands of
interaction between legal traditions and endowments. Also, the civil law group of early independence (with
90 percent of former Spanish colonies) is associated with more financial development than that gaining
independence later.
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traditional chiefs and to ineffective legal systems, with negative consequences for the
development of financial markets. In contrast, France pursued legal assimilation throughout
the empire and its colonial legal policies were set accordingly (Zweigert and Kötz). The
French empire was more centralized than the British, and colonial dominions were
considered as an intrinsic part of the Republic (Fieldhouse 1966). These particularities led to
a more rigid and uniform application of the law across the empire, which can largely account
for the fact that the impact of the French civil law on finance does not depend on initial
endowments.
We make another contribution to the law and finance literature by arguing strongly in favor
of distinguishing former Spanish colonies from the other civil law countries. We do so for a
couple of reasons: 1) they share the legacy of the Spanish law tradition, which facilitated the
reception of the Civil Code, and 2) all the Spanish American colonies imported the Civil
Code by a common procedure, namely, imitation. The evidence supports our argument since
former Spanish colonies show a higher level of financial development than those territories
where the civil law was implanted by France itself. The effect of the Spanish law legacy is
also independent of the level of initial endowments, which can be explained because Spain
also applied Castilian laws uniformly across its American colonial possessions and all the
American colonies adopted the Civil Code through voluntary transplant (Garro 1992,
González 1992).
Although this paper focuses on historical events, the consequences of the processes set in
motion in the distant past continue to persist today. Those territories where European legal
systems were not adapted to local circumstances or were hardly implanted deserve maximal
attention from a policy perspective. Also, it is interesting to analyze the possible advantages
of certain regions sharing the same legal influence. In this sense, the more rigid
31
implementation of the civil law in French colonies, although negative in some aspects, can
provide some advantages. For example, since 1993 sixteen countries in the francophone Sub-
Saharan Africa adopted uniform commercial and financial legislation within the framework
of the OHADA,31 which is a useful policy tool to promote trade, financial integration and
economic growth. These developments in regional integration and other topics related to
legal traditions are fields of great interest for researchers.
31 The French acronym for “Organisation pour l'Harmonisation du Droit des Affaires en Afrique”
(www.ohada.com).
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Less than or equal to
the median of
population density in
1500
Greater than the
median of
population density
in 1500
Mean
differences
(t -statistic)
All colonies
Panel A: Comparing British common law and French civil law countries
All colonies 0.41 0.22 0.20 0.32
52 48 (3.257) 100
- British Common law 0.65 0.17 0.47 0.47
25 15 (4.186) 40
- French civil law 0.20 0.24 -0.04 0.22
27 33 (-0.924) 60
Panel B: Distinguishing among French civil law countries
• Implantation by France 0.09 0.19 -0.10 0.15
9 15 (-1.866) 24
• Spanish law legacy 0.28 0.29 -0.01 0.29
9 9 (-0.083) 18
• Others 0.22 0.26 -0.04 0.24
9 9 (-0.481) 18
LEGAL TRADITIONS, INITIAL ENDOWMENTS AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
NOTES: Dependent variable is private credit by deposit money banks and other non-bank financial institutions over GDP.
Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix A. The sample contains non-European countries colonized by Western
powers (Appendix B). The number of countries appears in italics.
TABLE 1
Private Credit: mean values
40
Additive
model
Interaction
model
Splitting
civil law
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
-0.073***
(0.023)
- Common law (Ref. group)
-0.202*** -0.274***
(0.054) (0.059)
-0.420*** -0.231*** -0.470*** -0.427*** -0.351*** -0.335*** -0.330*** -0.271***
(0.061) (0.064) (0.065) (0.060) (0.068) (0.070) (0.071) (0.079)
-0.203*** -0.221*** -0.476*** -0.236*** -0.195*** -0.164** -0.114 -0.260***
(0.068) (0.064) (0.106) (0.086) (0.069) (0.068) (0.078) (0.053)
-0.264*** -0.231*** -0.296*** -0.300*** -0.214*** -0.215*** -0.182** -0.269***
(0.069) (0.058) (0.065) (0.066) (0.068) (0.068) (0.080) (0.059)
-0.144*** -0.144*** -0.080*** -0.129*** -0.146*** -0.126*** -0.109*** -0.114*** -0.136***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.025) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.024)
0.006
(0.019)
0.071* 0.018 0.126*** 0.046 0.042 0.025 0.062 0.019
(0.038) (0.041) (0.046) (0.039) (0.037) (0.040) (0.037) (0.063)
0.000 0.012 0.013 -0.002 0.013 0.049 0.015 0.008
(0.029) (0.035) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.038) (0.032) (0.029)
0.016 0.043* 0.004 0.007 0.011 0.008 0.013 0.040*
(0.025) (0.023) (0.016) (0.023) (0.026) (0.020) (0.025) (0.020)
Ln GDP pc 0.113***
(0.019)
0.002***
(0.001)
Religion (p-value) [0.182]
-0.165
(0.100)
Latitude 0.623**
(0.260)
Land in tropics -0.065
(0.058)
-0.060
(0.070)
-0.288***
(0.071)
0.479*** 0.490*** 0.490*** -0.487*** 0.389*** 0.303 0.552*** 0.345*** 0.440*** 0.620***
(0.057) (0.055) (0.056) (0.159) (0.071) (0.187) (0.071) (0.082) (0.080) (0.070)
R2 0.28 0.41 0.44 0.56 0.51 0.42 0.41 0.45 0.35 0.57
Number of observations 100 100 100 98 96 99 98 99 89 100
Wald tests
H3: Differences in the interaction terms
0.00
0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02
0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
H4a: Differences in predicted values when pop. dens. is equal to 10 (log=2.3)
0.29
0.39 0.96 0.21 0.86 0.65 0.74 0.39 0.43
0.21 0.94 0.31 0.47 0.23 0.09 0.10 0.46
0.22 0.43 0.88 0.53 0.23 0.42 0.18 0.03
H5: Differences between Implantation by France and Spanish law legacy
0.00 0.89 0.96 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.90
0.14 0.92 0.04 0.36 0.55 0.69 0.35 0.87
TABLE 2
• Implantation by France
- Civil law
Controlling additional factors
Constant
Population density in 1500
MAIN REGRESSION RESULTS: PRIVATE CREDIT
NOTES: Dependent variable is private credit by deposit money banks and other non-bank financial institutions over GDP. Variable descriptions are provided in
Appendix A. The sample contains non-European countries colonized by Western powers (Appendix B). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and ***
denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. In the bottom part of the table we show the p-values of the Wald tests of equality of
coefficients. PD means population density.
• Spanish law legacy
• Others
- Common law x Pop. dens.
- Civil law x Pop. dens.
• Implantation by France x
Pop. dens.
• Spanish law legacy x Pop.
dens.
• Others x Pop. dens.
Years since independence
Ethnic fractionalization
Latin America and Caribbean
Africa
a For low levels of endowments, this hypothesis is tested for a value of population density equal to 1 (log=0). In this case the statistical significance of the
coefficient on the civil law dummy reflects whether the civil law group is statistically different from the reference group (the common law).
Common law x PD = Civil law x PD
Spanish law leg. x PD = Imp. by France x PD
Spanish law leg. = Imp. by France
Common law = Others
Common law x PD = Imp. by France x PD
Common law = Spanish law leg.
Common law = Imp. by France
Common law = Civil law
Common law x PD = Others x PD
Common law x PD = Spanish law leg. x PD
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Additive
model
Interaction
model
Splitting
civil law
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
-0.088**
(0.034)
- Common law (Ref. group)
-0.269*** -0.341***
(0.084) (0.097)
-0.487*** -0.221** -0.500*** -0.394*** -0.402*** -0.384*** -0.352*** -0.247***
(0.093) (0.087) (0.088) (0.084) (0.092) (0.114) (0.088) (0.091)
-0.324*** -0.331*** -0.422*** -0.024 -0.277*** -0.253** -0.196** -0.21*
(0.104) (0.084) (0.133) (0.132) (0.088) (0.099) (0.097) (0.107)
-0.208 -0.167* -0.227* -0.101 -0.141 -0.128 -0.081 -0.241**
(0.128) (0.088) (0.133) (0.109) (0.118) (0.125) (0.118) (0.102)
-0.161*** -0.161*** -0.053* -0.155** -0.145*** -0.116*** -0.106** -0.077*** -0.143***
(0.051) (0.052) (0.029) (0.060) (0.038) (0.034) (0.043) (0.026) (0.047)
-0.001
(0.027)
0.034** -0.040 0.047** -0.033 0.018 0.002 0.009 -0.064
(0.015) (0.032) (0.023) (0.045) (0.027) (0.040) (0.024) (0.055)
-0.022 -0.006 -0.018 0.002 -0.015 0.008 0.010 -0.019
(0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.059) (0.043) (0.053) (0.045) (0.043)
0.007 0.051 -0.026 -0.016 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.020
(0.041) (0.035) (0.031) (0.035) (0.044) (0.037) (0.037) (0.028)
Ln GDP pc 0.145***
(0.030)
0.001
(0.001)
Religion (p-value) [0.018]
-0.098
(0.134)
Latitude 0.391
(0.457)
Land in tropics -0.138
(0.091)
-0.388***
(0.140)
-0.473***
(0.118)
0.464*** 0.473*** 0.473*** -0.807*** 0.435*** 0.259 0.466*** 0.335** 0.426*** 0.751***
(0.091) (0.091) (0.093) (0.243) (0.138) (0.306) (0.094) (0.147) (0.086) (0.128)
R2 0.22 0.30 0.33 0.48 0.34 0.37 0.30 0.31 0.28 0.48
Number of observations 92 92 92 90 88 91 91 91 85 92
Wald tests
H3: Differences in the interaction terms
0.01
0.00 0.80 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.02 0.23
0.04 0.35 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.05
0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.00
H4a: Differences in predicted values when pop. dens. is equal to 10 (log=2.3)
0.79
0.67 0.01 0.73 0.14 0.22 0.17 0.04 0.58
0.97 0.06 0.65 0.10 0.72 0.95 0.98 0.62
0.19 0.47 0.55 0.09 0.33 0.30 0.40 0.15
H5: Differences between Implantation by France and Spanish law legacy
0.00 0.20 0.62 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.73
0.21 0.53 0.17 0.65 0.54 0.94 0.99 0.52
• Implantation by France
• Spanish law legacy
• Others
Constant
• Spanish law legacy x Pop.
dens.
• Others x Pop. dens.
Years since independence
Ethnic fractionalization
Latin America and Caribbean
Africa
TABLE 3
MAIN REGRESSION RESULTS: STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT
Controlling additional factors
Population density in 1500
- Civil law
- Common law x Pop. dens.
- Civil law x Pop. dens.
Common law x PD = Civil law x PD
Common law x PD = Imp. by France x PD
Common law x PD = Spanish law leg. x PD
Common law x PD = Others x PD
• Implantation by France x
Pop. dens.
Common law = Civil law
a For low levels of endowments, this hypothesis is tested for a value of population density equal to 1 (log=0). In this case the statistical significance of the
coefficient on the civil law dummy reflects whether the civil law group is statistically different from the reference group (the common law).
NOTES: Dependent variable is stock market capitalization, which represents the total value of listed shares over GDP. Variable descriptions are provided in
Appendix A. The sample contains non-European countries colonized by Western powers (Appendix B). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and ***
denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. In the bottom part of the table we show the p-values of the Wald tests of equality of
coefficients. PD means population density.
Common law = Imp. by France
Common law = Spanish law leg.
Common law = Others
Spanish law leg. = Imp. by France
Spanish law leg. x PD = Imp. by France x PD
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Additive
model
Interaction
model
Splitting
civil law
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
-5.057***
(1.279)
- Common law (Ref. group)
-15.097***-17.197***
(3.954) (4.240)
-26.230*** -14.297** -26.947***-25.744***-21.449***-21.796***-20.900***-21.289***
(5.723) (5.792) (6.203) (5.376) (7.068) (6.209) (5.523) (7.404)
-15.679*** -17.535*** -21.664*** -12.548 -17.986***-14.123*** -10.523** -22.695***
(5.256) (4.382) (6.981) (8.659) (5.036) (5.228) (5.224) (7.790)
-12.865** -12.733*** -14.063** -12.108** -11.319** -11.111** -10.866** -14.053***
(5.064) (4.563) (5.295) (4.762) (4.763) (5.063) (4.447) (5.192)
-7.449*** -7.449*** -4.172*** -7.022*** -7.321*** -7.004*** -6.155*** -6.097*** -7.387***
(1.458) (1.492) (1.343) (1.556) (1.551) (1.441) (1.699) (1.645) (1.285)
-2.680
(1.712)
1.564 -1.937 2.560 1.566 -1.723 -1.297 0.457 0.223
(2.629) (2.805) (3.583) (2.642) (3.622) (2.864) (2.564) (3.603)
-4.103 -3.297 -3.820 -4.136 -2.673 -1.088 -2.292 -3.667
(4.933) (4.960) (5.037) (5.007) (4.965) (4.896) (4.890) (4.998)
-2.989 -0.924 -3.685 -3.155 -3.668* -3.390* -2.538 -1.509
(2.102) (2.192) (2.512) (1.994) (1.947) (1.895) (1.860) (2.373)
Ln GDP pc 7.462***
(1.567)
0.050
(0.052)
Religion (p-value) [0.867]
-19.055**
(9.345)
Latitude 38.777**
(15.450)
Land in tropics -7.840*
(4.223)
4.394
(7.425)
-9.252**
(4.486)
54.142*** 54.381*** 54.381*** -9.780 51.864*** 61.804*** 64.691*** 46.241*** 53.901*** 57.782***
(3.487) (3.422) (3.503) (13.448) (4.897) (19.172) (6.601) (5.070) (4.094) (3.413)
R2 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.55 0.41 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.39 0.44
Number of observations 92 92 92 91 88 92 91 92 87 92
Wald tests
H3: Differences in the interaction terms
0.04
0.00 0.50 0.02 0.00 0.20 0.18 0.03 0.05
0.52 0.87 0.54 0.54 0.40 0.32 0.46 0.47
0.09 0.15 0.24 0.10 0.18 0.28 0.15 0.03
H4a: Differences in predicted values when pop. dens. is equal to 10 (log=2.3)
0.24
0.32 0.05 0.45 0.35 0.11 0.07 0.29 0.50
0.49 0.17 0.27 0.70 0.48 0.83 0.88 0.26
0.70 0.35 0.37 0.72 0.57 0.46 0.66 0.93
H5: Differences between Implantation by France and Spanish law legacy
0.08 0.62 0.58 0.17 0.65 0.18 0.08 0.89
0.31 0.81 0.31 0.32 0.88 0.97 0.62 0.53
NOTES: Dependent variable is protection of property rights, which reflects the level of protection of property rights and ranges from 0 to 100, where higher values
mean stronger protection. Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix A. The sample contains non-European countries colonized by Western powers
(Appendix B). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. In the bottom part of
the table we show the p-values of the Wald tests of equality of coefficients. PD means population density.
• Others
a For low levels of endowments, this hypothesis is tested for a value of population density equal to 1 (log=0). In this case the statistical significance of the
coefficient on the civil law dummy reflects whether the civil law group is statistically different from the reference group (the common law).
Constant
• Spanish law legacy x Pop.
dens.
• Others x Pop. dens.
Years since independence
Ethnic fractionalization
Latin America and Caribbean
Africa
Common law = Civil law
Common law x PD = Others x PD
• Implantation by France x
Pop. dens.
TABLE 4
MAIN REGRESSION RESULTS: PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
Controlling additional factors
Population density in 1500
- Civil law
• Implantation by France
• Spanish law legacy
Common law = Imp. by France
Common law = Spanish law leg.
Common law = Others
Spanish law leg. = Imp. by France
Spanish law leg. x PD = Imp. by France x PD
- Common law x Pop. dens.
- Civil law x Pop. dens.
Common law x PD = Civil law x PD
Common law x PD = Imp. by France x PD
Common law x PD = Spanish law leg. x PD
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APPENDIX A
Variable Description Source
Number of veto
players
Number of influential veto players in legislative and executive initiatives. A higher value means
more veto players. The reference year is 2005.
Beck et al. (2001a), from
Teorell et al. (2011).
Ethnic
fractionalization
Probability that two randomly selected individuals from a given country do not belong to the
same ethnolinguistic group.
Alesina et al. (2003), from
Teorell et al. (2011).
Executive
constraints
The extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives.
The scale ranges from 1 to 7, where a higher score means higher constraints. The reference year
is 2005.
Polity IV (Marshall, Gurr, and
Jaggers, 2010), from Teorell et
al. (2011).
Land in
geographical
tropics (%)
Percentage of land in geographical tropics, from Center of International Development
(Geographic datasets).
Gallup, Mellinger, and Sachs
(2001).
Latitude The absolute value of the latitude of the capital city divided by 90. La Porta et al. (1999), from
Teorell et al. (2011).
Legal origin Legal origin variable: English Common Law and French Commercial Code. We complement
this variable for three countries (Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam) with information from La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008).
La Porta et al. (1999), from
Teorell et al. (2011).
Legislative
competition
Degree of competition of the last legislative election. The scale ranges from 1 to 7, where a
higher score means higher political competition. The reference year is 2005.
Beck et al . (2001a), from
Teorell et al . (2011).
Mineral resources Average of mineral rents over GDP during the period 1960-2000. World Bank (2011).
Per capita GDP GDP per capita, PPP (Constant International USD). Year 2005. World Bank (2011), from
Teorell et al. (2011)
Population density Logarithm of population density in 1500 (total population divided by total arable land). Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2002)
Private credit Private credit by deposit money banks and other non-bank financial institutions over GDP. We
take the average 1991-2005 to reflect a structural measure of financial development.
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Levine (2010) and (2003a).
Protection of
property rights
This variable measures the degree of protection of property rights by laws and the government,
the possibility of expropriation, the independence of the judiciary and the enforcement of
contracts. The scale ranges from 0 to 100, where higher values mean stronger protection. The
reference year is 2005.
Heritage Foundation (from
Teorell et al ., 2011)
Religion Protestants, Catholics, Muslims and others as a percentage of population in 1980. La Porta et al. (1999), from
Teorell et al. (2011).
Settler mortality Logarithm of potential European settler mortality, measured in terms of deaths per annum per
1,000.
Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2002)
Stock market
capitalization
Represents the total value of listed shares over GDP. We take the average 1991-2005 to reflect a
structural measure of financial development.
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Levine (2010) and (2003a).
Sugar/Wheat ratio The indicator is calculated as: log[(1 + share of arable land suitable for sugarcane)/(1 + share of
arable land suitable for wheat)]. It is derived from the “Wheat/Sugar ratio” indicator of Easterly.
Easterly (2007).
Urbanization in
1500
Percent of population living in urban areas with at least 5,000 inhabitants, in 1500. Data for sub-
Saharan Africa are not available.
Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2002)
Years since
independence
2000 minus year of independence. Olsson (2009).
TABLE A1
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APPENDIX B
British Common Law St. Kitts and Nevis* British Eritrea British
Antigua and Barbuda British St. Lucia* British Gabon* French
Australia* British St. Vincent & the G.* British Guatemala* Spanish
Bahamas, The* British Sudan* British Guinea* French
Bahrain* British Swaziland* British Guinea-Bissau* Portuguese
Bangladesh* British Tanzania* British Haiti* French
Barbados* British Tonga British Honduras* Spanish
Belize* British Trinidad and Tobago* British Indonesia* Dutch
Bhutan British Tuvalu British Iraq British
Botswana* British Uganda* British Jordan* British
Brunei British United Arab Emirates British Kuwait* British
Canada* British United States* British Lao PDR* French
Cyprus British Vanuatu British-French Lebanon* French
Dominica* British Zambia* British Libya* Italian
Fiji British Zimbabwe* British Madagascar* French
Gambia, The* British Mali* French
Ghana* British French Civil Law Mauritania* French
Grenada* British Algeria* French Mauritius British
Guyana* British Angola* Portuguese Mexico* Spanish
Hong Kong* British Argentina* Spanish Morocco* French
India* British Benin* French Mozambique* Portuguese
Jamaica* British Bolivia* Spanish Nicaragua* Spanish
Kenya* British Brazil* Portuguese Niger* French
Kiribati British Burkina Faso* French Oman* British
Lesotho* British Burundi* Belgian Panama* Spanish
Malawi* British Cambodia* French Paraguay* Spanish
Malaysia* British Cameroon* French Peru* Spanish
Maldives British Cape Verde* Portuguese Philippines* US
Marshall Islands US Central African R.* French Qatar* British
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. US Chad* French Rwanda* Belgian
Namibia* British Chile* Spanish Senegal* French
Nauru Australian Colombia* Spanish Seychelles British
New Zealand* British Comoros French Suriname* Dutch
Nigeria* British Congo, Dem. Rep.* Belgian Syria* French
Pakistan* British Congo, Rep.* French São Tomé and P. Portuguese
Papua New Guinea* Australian Costa Rica* Spanish Togo* French
Samoa British Côte d'Ivoire* French Tunisia* French
Sierra Leone* British Djibouti French Uruguay* Spanish
Singapore* British Dominican Republic* Spanish Venezuela, RB* Spanish
Solomon Islands British Ecuador* Spanish Vietnam* French
Somalia Italian Egypt, Arab Rep.* British Yemen, Rep.* British
South Africa* British El Salvador* Spanish
Sri Lanka* British Equatorial Guinea* Spanish
NOTES: * indicates former colonies with no missing values for private credit and population density in 1500.
Colonizing countries appear on the right.
TABLE B1
LIST OF FORMER COLONIES
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FIGURES
FIG. 1. Legal Traditions, Initial Endowments and Financial Development.
Panel A: British common law
Panel B: French civil law
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